M arburg School, and not just irs most popular writings, which lie in the philosophy of science. Given the predominant recep£ion of the writings in this area, to introduce the philosophical principles and intentions diiving rhe Marburg School, one has to confront a widespread misunderstanding head-on. In most presentations, the (Neo-)Kantianism of the Marburg School is treated as a narrowed form of Kanr's philosophy. Allegedly, it reduces Ka nt's rranscenden tal philosophy ro a theory of naturalmathematical science, thereby relegating philosophy to a "handmaiden of the sciences." Kant's critical system becomes whittled down to an epistemology of natural-scientific cognition. A main concern in presenting this school must be a rejection of dtis erroneous reading, which is understandable only in light of the writings that were most widely read.
While it is true char the theory of scientific cognition the Marbw gers formuJated is an important aspect of this school, it would be misleading to see their main intentions exhausted in a theory of science. Instead, the main intention of this school was from the outset a broadening of the crit ique, both in method as well as scope. FormuJaically, "the critique of reason becomes the cri tique of culture, .. as Cassi rer announces in the first volume of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms in 1923 (Cassirer 1954 . Bur it is moscly overlooked that when Cassirer issues this "battle cry," he m erely repeats the semimenr that inspires the school as a whole, starting from Cohen and Narorp. Such a critique, however, cannot do without a look at the effort of the sciences that work on different aspects of cuJtural Life. As Narorp emphasizes, what is sought is "a truth which, armored with the impenetrable steel of the most genuine, most durable science, should ar the same time be fit to satisfy not calculating reason, burro answer co the most secret, innermost doubts and questions of the soul" (Natorp 2008: 22) .~ T h is concept of science is the target of critidsms that claim char science is an alienation From life and that culture is nothing bur the indifferent field of inauthentic existence.
T o sketch a grand vision of clhis school is the cask of this chapter. The school's scope is, in effect, so great chat it goes beyond that of Kant's architectonics, such that che designation "Neo-Kantian" is inadequate. lt is no exaggeration to say that this school presents one of the most encompassing phjlosophical visions to arise in the tradition of classical German philosophy. Having modified and updated Kant's critical philosophy, having taken in Hegel's philosophy and the dimension of the hisrorical, having wirnessed the dominance of scientific positivism in the latter half of ' Al l quot~tions from the German original arc rranslated by rh~ author. the nineteenth cenrury, and having observed other Neo-Kamian tendencies attempting ro cou nter the dominance of such a positivism, the Marburg School, in the late Cassirer, self-co nsciously situates itself between Kant and H egel. It is one of the last great syn thesizing attempts in the Enlightenment tradi tion before the advent of posrmodernism. But, as contemporary thought has moved beyond such a radical stance, there are reasons ro believe that there will be more sympathy for this "Marburg vision" roday. h has che power to rival or complement other attempts char consider modernism an "unfinished project" rather chan a quaint dream that is amgetriiumt.
As these preliminary reflections make clear, I treat rhe Marburg School as a unified phUosophical vision . This is not ro say that all members agreed on every aspect. H ence, it will be necessary to trace the steps that led, first, from Kant to Cohen , who laid out the first systematic position that defined the Marburg School. Yet, both Narorp and Cassirer were dissatisfied wich Cohen's position che moment it went beyond a philosophical justification of the exact sciences. The subtle moves on the part of Natorp away from Cohen are a story of their own, 4 though Natorp remained in strong outward uniry with Cohen. This "closing of ranks" is explicable only through rhe intellectual and political landscape of the rime. Cassirer, who never lived in M arburg and was, for that reason, o ften not considered part of this school , was unconcerned with such political games and expanded Cohen's scope, while remaining within the general framework of the Marburg School. Thus, rhe full-blown shape of t he Marburg School as a philosophy of cuhure can be seen in Cassi rer.
Hence, in the first section of this chapter, l discuss the general framework ofKanr's question as ro the conditio ns of the possibiliry of synthetic a priori cognition and how it rakes on the concrete task of philosophical work with respect to the existi ng factum of the sciences. The latter is the starring point for the Marburgers. T o repeat, the most important aspect of their philosophical efforts is their expansion of Kant's critique of reason into a critique of culture. A critiq ue of scientific culrure is bur the beginning. Bur, ro understand this transformation of the Kantian project into that of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, l discuss some key moves chat occurred in Cohen in order to bring about this novel project. ln the second section, I will trace the move from Cohen's "critical" idealism to Cassirer's "symbolic" idealism. Here, too, f confine myself ro the main moves occurring in Cassirer in order co reconstruct his philosophy of the symbolic. ln rhe third secrion, I will unfold the full-blown philosophy of culture as it is laid out in Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, including his teleological vision for humankind. ln a conclusion , I will spell our whar I believe could be the legacy of the Marburg School for contemporary effons in philosophy and culture writ large. T his legacy has lived on , in peculiar ways, in "N eo-Neo-Kantians," bur it has been forgotten that ir Aourished in Marburg a century ago.
From transcenden tal to critical idealism : the factum of the sciences Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is an exercise in theoretical philosophy (epistemology) and in rhis function an investigation into rhe nature, capacity, and limits of knowledge. Kant also dubs chis investigation a "tractate on method" since the task of critique involves concrete steps to establish the fac t that we have true cognition. "Real" rational cognition is, as Kanr is proud co have discovered, synthetic a priori, as our reason is capable of expanding our knowledge wi thour rhe aid of experience. Hence, the task Kant sets for himself is ro establish how this cognition comes abour. In the Firs t C ritique, this presentation is synthetic, in rhar Kant presents step by step the contributions of the two seems of knowledge, sensibility and understanding. T he possibility of sensibili ty is explained, in rhe Aesthetics, through the doctrine of space and time as forms of intuition. The Analytic discu sses the manner in which the undersrandj ng applies concepts (categories of pure reason) ro intuitio ns. The crucial step beyond an explanation of chis fact (quid focu) is the questio n as to how we are justified in making a priori claims abou t objects of experience (quid jactt) . In the Prolegomena, however, Kant opts for a different manner of presentation, the analytic one, starting our from the factum of existing cognition and inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of its comingabout. Both manners of presentation supposedly reach the same desired goal; their difference is merely heuristic.
lr is the analytic path of the critique that the Marburgers preferred. H ence, the factum of reason in rhe abstract was concretely worked our in rhe factum of science (das Faktum der Wissmschaft) . This insight is nor Kant's discovery, however, bur a restatement of the Western tradition.
The factum of science is the key ro understanding the Western project of philosophy, to Cohen, and Kant merely took up this tluead that began with Plato, who placed philosophy on the secure foundation of science. This entire tradition can only be adequately appreciated when seen through the prism of the constant proximity of ph.ilosophy and science beginning with Plato's idealism, w hich is "the methodological generaror of science" (Cohen 1987: xvii ) . Science, however, is an ongoing process by which thought, through the produccion of new ideas and hypotheses, conquers reality. What reality is can only be o btained under this assumption, rhar we can onJy comprehend what we, as Kant defines transcendental idealism, "lay inro rhings" through our reason. H ence, rhe connection between science and philosophy as idealism is a necessary one:
The factum of science is rhe basic assumption rhar philosophy makes and wirhour which it cannot begin. Therefore, this factum is nor dogmatically assumed bur is rather rhe methodological presupposition. If all thinking, as production of ideas. unfolds and constructs itself in hypotheses, then it is necessary ro understand as the first hypothesis: rhar of science itself. (Cohen 1987: 41) Thus, while scientific progress is o ngoing, what remains constant is the production of hypotheses, which are confirmed or fals ified. In this acdviry, the sciences are in effect idealistic, as they bring, in broad generali ty, real ity under ideas (concepts, theories). Only then can one truly speak of experience of reality. Cohen's original reading of Kant's Theory ofE-<perience (the ride of his first work on Kant), in his attempt to "lay a new ground for the Kanrian doctrine of the a priori" (Cohen 1987: ix) , is d1at rhe experience Kant means is me experience on the part of the scientist, when she conceives the numbers and laws under which nature stands. This is an o ngoing activity of thought, nor in the generational sequence of researchers, bur in terms of rhe logical content of the scientific achievements (Cohen is a fierce enemy of a psychologistic reading of scientific progress).
The factum is, as Narorp says, a fieri, someth ing being made, a making on th e part of thinking su bjects with regard to the logical progress (Natorp 2013: 39) . As fieri, this progress is never-ending. Reality as fully logically penetrated is the unatta inable " rhing in itself."
Looking back ar Kant's rranscendentaJ idealism , what has thus happened here? Transcendental ideaJism is the claim that we unde rtake rhe Copernican experiment to view objects insofar as they conform ro our cognitive capacities and rhar we never experience the thing in itself bur aJways only insofar as it appears ro us. ln the Marburg reading, modern natural science is already enacting this ideaJism , unbeknownst ro itself.
The phe nomena that science ascertains are rhe laws of nature that we impose based on our reason. Philosophy, then , has no task of its own, it can have no territory of its own where it can perform itssuigeneris work. All it can do is reconstruct the work in t he sciences, nor attempt ro do so mething over and beyond ir. lt is, thus, a critique of the factum of the sciences; the c ritique is a critique of reason as it is enacted in scientific progress. As such, Cohen conceives transcendental idealism as critical ideaJism with the express purpose of critiquing thought as it becomes enacted in the sciences. This confirms the close tie between philosophy and science that is the signature of Western thought. Kant merely brought this insight to rhe clearest expression.
How does philosophy do this, concre tely? What remains as the task of philosoph y (the "uanscendenral method")? Cohen describes the latter thus:
C ritique, rhus, means first and foremost the warning: not to identifY or place on equal footing philosophy with mathematics or natural science. Philosophy's task is nor to create things or -as the seductive and infamous saying goes, borrowed from mathematics -to 'construct' them, but instead merely to understand and to test how the objens and laws of mathematical experience are constituted. Bur the critique yields, along with chis warning, ar che same time the insight and the consolacion that mathematical natural science does not merely rest on mathematics and experience, bur itself partakes in philosophy. The critique reaches to see and explore chis partaking, and the philosopher exploring this feels in rhe object of his critique the spirit of his own spirit. (Cohen 1987= 73 ¥".) What happens now with one of the central demands of Kant, the establishmenc of a priori cognition, if science is an ongoing process that never ends?
Did not Kant claim to have discovered the totality of categories and the principles by which we apply the former co nature? Here we find what is perhaps the most original idea developed by the Marburg School. If science is an ongoing process, then the original catego ries char Kant discerns wiU not suffice for the purpose of giving expression to rational cognition. Bur the option of simply dropping the demand of a priori cognition cannot simply be accepted , since this would open the door to relativism. The solution can only be to reconceive che a priori. As Cohen states, "new problems will require new presuppositions. The necessary idea of the progress in science has as a necessary presupposition . .. the idea of che progress of pure cognitions" (Cohen 1977: 396) . The a priori becomes, thus, dynamic, 5 insofar as new insighcs require new concepts that are necessary for the time being bur which can be modified or expanded (or perhaps rendered obsolete) as the progress ensues. This is the attempt co reconcile the claim to objective knowledge with the dynamic progress of scienrific cognition, which is rational, not merely empirical. As Cassirer states:
The "facr" of science is and will of course remain in irs nature a hismrically developing facr. If in Kanr this insight does nor yet appear explicitly, if his categories can still appear as finished "core concepts of reason" in number and conrenr, then the modern developmenr of critical and idealistic logic [i.e., Cohen] has made this point perfectly clear. The formJ of judgment mean for it the unified and active motivations of thought, which course through rhe manifold of its particuJar formations and are conrinuaUy pur ro use in the generation and formulation of new categories. (Cassirer 1994a: 18) In Cassirer's rendition of this concept, one can distinguish, more precisely, cwo levels of a priori, a strict and a dynamic one, as he says in a letter to Schlick:
I would call "a priori" in rhe stricr sense merely the idea of"unity of namre," that is, of the lawfulness of experience as such or perhaps. more concisely, the "distinctness of attribution" [Eintkutigktit der Zuordmmg] . .. But this principle of distinctness irselfis, to me, indeed, more than just a "convention" or an "inducrive generalization": it is, tO me, an expression of" reason," of Logos itself. (Cas. sirer 2009a: 5o-51, from October 2. 3, 1920) Beyond the strict sense of 11 priori, there is a dynamically evolving web of concepts char are necessary for a given phenomenon a nd for rhe rime being, the "very best bets" we have at a given time, with the knowledge that we might have better or different hers at a later stage of scientific development.
This conception of the a priori retains the uanscendenral nature of Kane's philosophy (necessary conditions of possibility of cognition), while acknowledging that science makes progress and ever-expands its boundaries. The idea of sci en ti6c progress is, however, purely "logical," concerning the progress of rational cognition, not a matter of em pirical discovery. But to the Marburgers, new empirical discoveries are only then real ("experienced") when they are understood rationally. Everything else would be a fallback into a naive realism that purports tO be in touch with the "things themselves."
Now if cogn ition can only be acrained in the sciences, what is left for philosophy to do other than co "attesr to" (beglaubigm) the latter, as Cohen interpretS the justificatory aspect of critique? At this point the cririque of philosophy as the "handmaiden of the sciences" seems to srick. Can philosophy do anything but "follow carryi ng the train of lady science" (Cassirer 2004: 358) ? And if so, does this not mean that philosophy as a discipline of irs own has become obsolere? The Marburgers were, of course, well aware of this reproach. I wiU rerum to this poi or in the conclusion. For now, we can utiliz.e rhe proximity between philosophy and science to set out the broad lines of the Marburg School, returning to the project of a philosophy of culture.
Critical idealism is most carefully worked out in Cohen 's theory of scientific cognition. But, according to the original intention, the uanscendental method should be put to work in all areas of cuJrure. C ultme is defined as "the entire work of humanity in which the latter produces and forms ever higher [hinaufbildn] what is pecu liar to humanity itself' (Nacorp 2008: 42) . The areas of culrure, such as what is made by human beings -focere does nor only take place in science -fo llow the Kamian canonical distinction into epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. The philosophy of culture, then, is the logic of each cultural formation, where the transcendental method reconstructs the logics that produce each cultural region. Such a particular logic can, tO Cohen, only reconstruct the logical structure of that cultural region, not irs empirical or material elements. But just as in epistemology, rhe logical concepts underpinning ethics and law can only be derived from an existing science. The paradigm of starring out, in each region, from the "factum of the sciences," means that in ethics one must start our from legal science, jurisprudence, which is the point of crysraJi iz.arion of legal affairs. The grounding of erhics, hence, can only occur through a reconstruction of the concepts and theories of an existing legal theory. Ideally, there is, as an ideal na tural scien ce, an ideal legal science as factum chat is constantly under way, yet with the status of its laws a nd proced ures as a priori.
Where it is plausible chat natural science works towards an ideal status, such a claim might strike one as less than convincing in the realm of jurisprudence. While Cohen might have had in mind a universal doctrine of universal human rights, the re are undeniably very di fferent legal systems based on differe nt legal traditions, which are unlikely ever to converge. Bur the uanscendental method becomes even less con vincing when Cohen declares that art history is the scientific facru m from whk h one has to de rive the logic in the realm of aesthetics. Such a rathe r artifi cial approach raises the question whether such a search for a logical structure starring fro m a scientific factum can do justice to the wealth and multiplicity of culture. W hen rhe Marburg School, hence, is chastised for having a "scientistic" or "logicistic" outlook on culture, this critique is justified, the mome nt o ne goes beyond a theory of scientific cognition. It is at this point that Cassirer deparrs from h is reacher and moves into his own philosophy of culture, centered on rhe concept of the symbolic. Cassirer's main philosophical con tribution after his historical work o n the developme nt of modern science in Das Erkenntnisproblem (volumes 1 and JJ appeared in 1906 and 1907) was his recognition chat a profound paradigm shift had occurred in modern science, more precisely in the process of concept formation. Scie ntists, in a ntiquity, believed that concepts mi rrored things in the world. What unde rlay th is assumption, as well as the concomitant conception of objects, was Aristotle's substance onrology. Accordingly, concepts were substance concepts. This Aristotelian manner o f co ncept formatio n has endured into modernity. G radually, however, this process was paralleled and subsequently replaced by a different one, which conforms to the "transcendental" reading of modern science according to the Marburgers. Modern science has already been performing the Copernican turn insofar as the theories are not read off of the things (themselves) bur a re a rational c reation; they are what we lay inro nature through reason. Accordingly, concepts scientists use to express lawful structures under which nature stands are memal creations, not read off of substances "out there" (recall a concept such as "atom"). These concepts are themselves the reflection of a different ontology. Such an ontology cannot be about substances existing independently of us. Instead, things are what they are to us to the extent that we construct them through our rational labor. This labor consists in the creation of theories and, more essentially, concepts, which do not stand as substances in and of themselves. Instead, concepts are relational, and the process of concept formation in modern science is the creation of a string (Reihe) of relations. Cassirer concludes his historical overview of this process: 1994b: 19f.) This standing-in-relation accordjng ro a principle of order is captured in the mathematical concept offunction,f(x). The concept in modern science is a "mle for the connection of rhe individual" (Cassirer 1994b: 25), whereby the "generality of a string-principle is the characteristic moment of the concept" (Cassirer 1994b: 26) . Gradually, in modern science, the "logic of the mathematical functional principle" (Cassirer 1994b: 27) comes ro confront and replace rhe concept of substance. The functional concept can also be called a symbol:
The basic concepts of every science, rhe means by which it poses irs questions and forms its solutions, no longer appear as passive representations of a given emiry, bur as self-created imellecrual symbols. (Cassirer 1954: 1: 5) To the extent that Cassirer explains the modern use of conceprs as formed through a functional principle, rendering them symbols, he is adding greater derail ro Cohen's basic doctrine. Bur Cassirer, by the time he has developed his philosophy of the symbolic in the 1920s, goes beyond Cohen and his own analysis of 1910 with the drum that this symbolism is at work nor only in the realm of scientific cognition, bur in all functions of "spiritual life." Spirirual life writ large is symbol-crearing, and the symbolic is ubiqwrous:
Every genuine basic function of spirir has in common with cognition rhis one rrair rhar an original-formative, nor jusr imirarive, power is inherenr in 2.Jl ir. The latter does nor just express passively what is there, bur conrains a spiritual energy of its own through which simple enriries of intuition receive a certain " meaning," a peculiar ideal conrenr. This goes for arras ir does for cognition, for myth as well as religion. They all Live in peculiar image-worlds in which nor merely somerhing empirically given mirrors irself, bur which rhey produce according to an independent principle. Each oF rhem creates irs own symbolic forms which are, nor identical co, bur in their own spiritual origin on a par [ebmbtlrtig] wirh inrdlecrual symbols. (Cassirer 1954: 1: 9)
The ubiquiry of the symbolic, beyond scientific concept formation, is the basic ide.a of d1e philosophy of symbolic forms. Cassirer's conception of rhe symbol-creating spiritual energy is me antithesis of any representationalism, according to which (as Rorty claims) me human mind is the mirror of narure. ln Cassirer's use of me mirror image, me opposite holds; reality is the mirror of rhe human mind, whkh is nor exhausted in producing cognition alone. Cognition with its scientific memod is one form of spirirual energy; oilier spiritual energies, those ar work in mym, religion, art, have their own function al structures, generating their own symbolic forms. The task of philosophy is ro perform me "transcendental method" on dlem, not in
Cohenian fashjon searching for each respective Factum of science, bur in reconsrrucring the functional principle by which each spirirual energy creares and shapes the functional nexus governing each form. This is a task philosophy can not do without leaning on empirical research in rhese different areas, bur rhis is different from choosing a factum of science of mese cultural realms for a reconstrucrion of their "logics." The functional principle at work in different forms of culture cannot be reduced to a logic; "function" displaces Cohen 's rigid concepcion of logic. The term "spiri tual energy" is nor ro invoke some form of mysricism; it is me result of a reconstruction starting regressively from me different spheres of meaning mar an, myth, etc. are. They are rhe facta into whose "conditions of possibility" must be inquired. But mese difterent spheres of meaning are not simply there. T hey are created, they are the results of different types of imuirion, of which Kanr merely discerned rhe abstract forms of space and rime. Intuition is nor passively receiving bur actively forming. There is a plurality of experiencing me world, and each rype of viewing sees something differenr. Mythical space is different from me space of modern physics, as it is different from the space of an or religion. This is nor an empirical Statement abour the psychological capacities of me human species, but a transcendental Statement concerning me cuJrure-formjng capacities of me mind. Kant's Transcendental Aesthetics becomes pluralized, bur each account of a pardcuJar intuition remains mereby transcendental, clarifying the constirucive principles governing each functional nexus. Cassirer illustrates this plurality of seeing with an example; I grasp in [a serpentine line] rhe characrer of a cerrain omamem. which is linked up for me with a cerrain arrisric meaning and an arristic significatio7r ... Once again rhe form of rhe observation can change, insofar as chat which at first presented irself ro me as a pure ornamenr, can reveal irself as the bearer of a mythical-religious meaning .... And to this form of seizing and internal acquisitio n we can juxtapose, with deliberare sharpness, anorher one . .. While the aes thetically conremplaring and savoring individual gives himself over to the intuition of the pure form , where ro rhe religiously touched person a mystical meaning is disclosed in rhis form; rhe form thar stands before one's eyes can also serve for thought as an example of a purely logical-conceprual srruccural nexus ... Where the aesthetical direction of viewing perhaps saw Hogarth's Line of Beaucy, the mathemarician's gaze sees rhe image of a certain trigonometric funcrion, e.g., che image of a sine curve, while the mathematical physicisr sees in rhe same curve rhe law of a periodic wave. (Cassirer 2009b: 97f.) The concrete task of rhe philosophy of the symbolic is to describe the "symboUc logic" in each case of symboUc formation. An individual thing is construed as a symbol; it makes sense only in a context of other things; hence rhe symbol is the "throwing rogether" (sym-batlein) of the individual and the general. Its meaning is contl!xtua/ and has a different meaning in differenr symbolic gues. This a mounts to the universalization of Kant's transcendental idealis m: the phenomenon becomes the symbo l, and to account for it means co reconstruct the "logic," the funcrional principle in each symbolic form. M yth , an, religion, science aiJ have rheir own structural principles a nd manners offuncrioning.
6 Thus we arrive, fro m critical idealism, ar symbolic idealism. The sum coral of these symbolic forms is cuJrure; it is the tota1icy of the deeds on the part of humans, "for the con rent of the con cept of culture can nor be isolared from the basic forms and directions of spirirua1 producing: 'being' is always only robe grasped in 'doing'" (Cassirer 1954: 1: 11). 7 C ulture itself, then, is itself a fun ctional concept that can be defined only th rough the deeds that bring it about, and not through a formal definjtion , which would render it a substantial "thing." This is why the philosophy of the symbolic can neve r be a finished "system." Rather, the systematic h What they have in common is what one can call the triad of the symbolic: the function of impression, expression, and presentation, but th~ functions work differemly in the different forms: $Ce Cusirer :tQ09b: 7o--j.
" One ofCassirer's favorite authof'1 is Goo he. Recall that Faust rranslat~ "klgos· as "Tat" {deed): sec
character of rhis philosophy must be demonstrated in rhe method of reconstructing the fUnctional nexuses and in distinguishing the basic nexuses from one another. T he concrete method of this philosophy is, thus, phenomenological.
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Cassirer was not able ro complete his "system, " since his Beeing from the Nazis forced him co change plans for publish ing the Philosophy of Symbolic Fonns. After he had moved from Ger many to England, from there to Sweden and finally to the United Stares, his relocations and encounters with different intellectual milieus caused his interests co shift. His philosophical plans were far from completed when he died in 1945. This can be seen from the many additions an d novel ideas that Cassirer produces after 1933. T here is no denying that Cassirer left many crirics wanting and many questions unanswered. Cassirer never doubted the truth of the projecr of a critique of culture as an analysis of rhe symbolic in irs manifold expressions. By way of discussing some critical questions, I turn to the metaphilosophicaJ significance of a critique of culture.
T he complementaristic plurality of culture and humanity's self-liberation in culture
The purpose of the philosophy of symbolic for ms as a critique of culture is ro give a rich accounr of the plural expressions of culture while keeping such an account within the bou ndaries of transcendental philosophy. The philosophy of symbolic forms is no empirical science, though it can and must rely on material provided by scientific disciplines. One will never find Cassirer discussing a problem without reference to scholarship; e.g., linguistics in the case of language, and anthropology in the case of mythical consciousness. 9 However, the claim is a philosophical one, ro provide the basic fu nctional structure of each symbolic fo rm, its particular logic, which is the respective condi tion of the possibility of viewing, thereby creating, the world, "irs" world. While there can be no sysrem that wouJd claim robe complete -culture is an ever-evolvi ng process-the question remains, what is rhe overall aim of this philosophy? !fir was said that the concrete method is phenomenological (descriptive), one can point our that no descri ptio n is naive and without presuppositions. What is, thus, the guiding clue underpinning Cassirer's analyses? T he plurality and richness of culture cannot be subjected to che benchmark of science. Conversely, the philosophy of culture makes it clear mar a merely empirical account of culture will not suffice, because such an account is prone ro a cultural relativism. But what is me Status of the symbolic forms themselves in the framework of a transcendental account? I c is curious that Cassirer, when it comes to the number of symbolic forms, rarely gives a "deduction" or a justification of why he mentions che ones he does and not others. Moreover, his enumerations vary and sometimes include other forms besides language, myrh, religion, arc, and cognition . And it is even more curious ro note that he devotes systematic studies only to language, myth, an d cognition, and in this o rder. What is th e rat ionale for his procedure? Cassirer is nor consistent and fully clear here, and there is no denying these systemat ic gaps. Parr of this lack of fu !J exposi tion can be chalked up to Cassi rer's inability co finish his philosophy due to his biography. The face that he is not co nsistent in enumerating rhe symbolic forms -in later years, he mentio ns technology and economy -can be countered by reminding us of the functional nature of cuJ ture, that culture cannot be defined from above and chat it is possible rhat new forms arise in the process of cuJ rure. Indeed , such a discussion about the arrival of new forms of culture can be an interesting exercise in cultural philosophy (is, fo r instance, che Internet a new sym bolic form?). As he says, "human civilization n ecessarily creates new fo r ms, new symbols, new material things in which che life of man finds irs external expression" (Cassirer 1979: 139) . Bur there is one importanc point where Cassirer's wavering gives rise to a mo re serious co ncern.
On the one hand, Cassirer insists char he wants co give an account of the richness of"spiritual activity" where each spiritual power has irs sui generis "logic'' that cannot be compared co others, and ir would be a metabasis if one symbolic form were measured by the standard of another (as Cohen did when measuring all ocher forms with the standard of science). Thus, the symbolic forms are irreducible co one another. The philosophy of symbolic forms is an account of these symbolic forms without such an overreaching from one form co another. They are, in this scenario, ordered horizontally, displayi ng no hierarchy. Rather, they complement one another, rogecher yielding a richer sense of culture (Cassirer quotes H egel, das Ganze ist das Wahre). It is the cask of the philosophy of the symbolic co "spell out of phenomena d ifferent symbols and, so co speak, different alphabets of thought that do not contradict each orher but complete one another" (Cassirer 1979: 76) . On the other han d, statements as ro the relation of t he different forms ro one anothe r in terms of a hierarchy are not absent. For one, Cassirer is unfailingly dear on one poim, the system atic locus of myth. Myth is the first form of spiritual and cultural development, which is primitive (though not irrational) and is overcome through higher forms of cult ural expression.
Religion, language, and science "conquer" myth and relegate it ro a form of unenlightened pre-culm ral existence. It is a stage of human development to which one may not return in a developed culture. T he fact that myth is made to re-enter the arena of culture is his critique of modern fascism (cf. Cassirer 1946) . T his marks him as standing in the traditio n of the Enlightenment. Conversely, Cassirer speaks of science as the highest expression of human spirit and as the purpose and end-goal of culture. While all symbolic forms "possess their own dis£inc tive type of 'universal validity' ... the clearest and best example of such ' u niversal validity' continues, in good Marburg sryle, ro be given by the language of mathem atical exact science. "' 0 These passages make him vulnerable to the charge that despite the emphasis on a ll cultural forms being equal, they are, at the end of the day, subordinate ro scientific theory and irs logical ideal of universal validity in a lingua zmiversa/is, and to the critique that he remains aloofly disrespectful of o ur facticiry and our fi nitude. In t his way, one may summarize H eidegger's position against Cassirer during the Oavos standoff.
There is, as mentioned, no denying that one finds conflicting passages in this respect. A solutio n can only be ro spell our wha t Cassirer should have unambiguomly said in light of this conuadiction . Should scientific conduct be inrerpreted as the highest form of human culture? Surely a scientific positivism o r unal loyed belief in scientific progress is not Cassirer's sentiment. Despite his admi ration for modern science, and his inrimate knowledge thereof, Cassirer is nonetheless more aptly placed on the "humanistic" side of the "two culrures." Or perhaps better, Cassirer's position is best described as "syn thetic" in wanting ro do justice ro borh traditions, in that the humanistic aspect of cultu re should not be left unaccounrable ro reason and rational critique, and in that natural-scientific reason should not operate in rhe way of a cold-hearted technology. Thus, while the philosophy of cu lture was described as proceeding by a descriptive method, the normative aspect of critique must not be overlooked. To subject culture ro critique, then, must not be understood in the way of a cold rational look at culture, and hence the excl usive search for logical structures, bur in the way in which Narorp describes rationali ty, as answering ro the deepest questions of manki nd. The "critique of culcure" may rh us not be seen as the call tO rationally "scan " rhe different cultural forms as ro their "deep" rational structures. Rather, what must be emphasized is that culture is the correlate of the common humanity that unites us; in all cultural forms we find " ultimately the 'sa me' human being that we always continual ly encounter in the development of culture, in thousands of manifestations a nd in thousands of masks." in its richness of expression. It makes us understand that there is nor and ought nor ro be any life outside of culture, and that culture is both our space and ours ro create responsibly.
Conclusion. The legacy of Marburg: the collaboration of philosophy and science; the emancipatory function of culture Regarding the legacy of the Marburg School, let me mention one aspect in conclusion, where [ believe irs efforts bear resemblance to some of roday's philosophical concerns.
Let me return to the critique of philosophy as rhe "handmaiden of the sciences." The critique consists in the claim that, with this allencompassing ideaJ of culture and the insistence that philosophy cannot do without the individuaJ sciences deaJing with the differem forms of culruraJ expression, philosophy is indeed relegated ro nothing other than the former's handmaiden. I think it is fair to say that many contemporary philosophers would bristle ar this notion of philosophy. fn order to correctly assess what philosophy is to accomplish, one can compare the Marburg School with another form of Neo-Kantianism, namely Robert Brandom's inferentialism. I cannot delve deeper into one of the most impressive philosophies of our day, nor do 1 claim that Brandom is the only contemporary phiJosopher who could serve as example here. r only wish to point our one contemporary parallel to the Marburg position. In phjlosophy's task of "making explicit" the discursive commitmems we undertake when we engage in the "social ·pracrices of giving and asking for reasons" (Brandom 2001: 92) , Brandom rejects the role of philosophy as being the "queen of the sciences" ("philosophy is at most a queen of the sciences, nor the queen" (93)). Indeed, philosophy plays no "foundational role with respect ro other disciplines" (ibid.) and in this sense, Brandom expressly embraces the image of rhe "handmaiden" (ibid.), and he describes the task of philosophy as follows:
For what we do char has been misundersrood as having foundational or methodological significance is to provide and apply tools for unpacking the substantive commirmenrs char are implicit in the concepts deployed throughout rhe culture, including the specialired disciplines of the high culcure. Making those norms and inferences explicit in rhe form of claims exposes them for the first rime ro reasoned assessmenr, challenge, and defense, and so to the sort of rational emendation that is the primary process of conceprual evolution. But once rhe implicit presuppositions and consequences have been brought out inro the daylight of explicitness, the SEBAST IA N LUFT process of assessment, emendation, and evolution is the business of chose whose concepts they are, and nor somethi ng philosophers have any authoricy over or expertise regarding. This definition of rhe rask of philosophy has interesting similarities wirh that of the Marburg School. The Marburgers would agree that ph ilosophy can not, and should not, provide an ultimate fow1darion , ir cannot be " first" philosophy, since it canno t make itself independe nt of the sciences which cUscover the concepts and functions of the regions they are sciences of. As Cohen says, philosophy is no Gnmdlngenwisumchnfi, a scie nce of foundations. Bur as handmaide n, it also develops the tools fo r "ratio nal emenda tion," which precisely is c ritique, bur necessarily critique ofsomerhing rhar functions implicitly th rough norms, and this is culture. Directly addressing the issue of whether philosoph y is the torch-o r train-bearer of the sciences, Cassirer maintains that the re can be a third alternative. Philosophy's task can nor consist in mediating the inner battles rhar always again arise in science and co silence them through hasty solutions. Rarher, it stands in the midst of rhese bardes, it cannor and wishes nor to be anything bm rhe fellow combatant [Mimr~ilt'rin) in these. I nsread of overcoming rhe opposirions rhrough rhe command of thought or arrempcing to reconcile them through a mere comprom ise, it must rarher make rhese visible in rheir full serio usness and graviry. (Cassirer 2004: 358) As combatant in these banles, philosophy equally has the cask of making explicit rhe functional principles guiding rhe symbolic fo rms, which is nor somethi ng individual sciences can do on rheir own, bur which is nor something entirely above and beyond rhem e ither. P hilosophy merely has the task of making explicit whar goes on implicitly in the culrural activities. What is m ade explicit in the essentially self-reflective intellectual acriviry philosophy is rhe fact that culture is the expressio n of rhe common humani ry char we share. Surely, the philosophy of symbolic forms "makes [hings explicir" in its own m a nner, as explained in chis essay, b u r in this division-of-labor concept of philosophy, "Marburg" bears striking s im ilarity to " Pittsb urgh ." But understood in the right way, this is noc a reproach chat should pur philosophers working in chis mode on the defensive. Instead, it is rhe healthy balance any philosophy must mike when it acknowled ges that it cannot o perate in a vacuum bur in a culture rich wirh creative work, pan of which is carried out in the sciences, while nor ceding irs position to na turalism .
The moraL demand is that this process of culrure becomes everexpanded, keeping barbarism at bay, while knowing char the human
